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Abstract 
Firms exhibit persistence in innovation output. This paper focuses on the role played by 
individual inventors. Compared to firm organizational capital, human capital embedded in 
inventors explains a majority of the variation in innovation performance but much less in 
innovation style. Inventors contribute more when they are better networked, in firms with higher 
inventor mobility, and in industries in which innovation is more difficult. Additional tests 
suggest that our main findings are unlikely driven by inventors’ endogenous moving. This paper 
highlights the importance of human capital in enhancing firm innovation and sheds new light on 
the theory of the firm. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Schumpeter, existing literature has well established that innovation is crucial to 
firms’ competitive advantages (Porter, 1992) and long-run growth of the economy (Solow, 1957). 
The differential ability to generate innovation, argued by prior studies, is the major source of 
heterogeneity in firm performance (Nelson, 1991, 1995; Winter, 1984, 2003). However, there are 
large differences in innovation output between top innovative and the rest of the firms. For 
example, Cohen et al. (2013) report persistence and predictability in a firm’s ability to do R&D 
and produce patents.  
What drives a firm’s persistence in innovation output? There must be something time-
invariant and unique embedded in the firm. Since Coase (1937), there has been a longstanding 
debate on the unique factor that defines a firm. In the Hart-Moore framework, nonhuman assets, 
such as physical assets, organizational structure, corporate culture, and access to resources, are 
the glue that brings a firm together (see, e.g., Hart (1995) for a detailed discussion). Zingales 
(2000), however, argues that “human capital is emerging as the most crucial asset” in today’s 
world and highlights the importance of human capital. It is an open yet unanswered question on 
the relative importance of firm organizational capital and human capital of the employees inside 
the firm in terms of contributing to the firm’s innovation persistence. In this paper, we attempt to 
answer this research question and shed new light on the understanding of what constitutes a firm.  
A major challenge of our study is to separate the contribution of organizational capital 
and human capital. Patent generation (by individual inventors) provides a unique setting that is 
clean and rich when dealing with this empirical challenge. First, innovation typically requires 
specialized knowledge and skills possessed by researchers (instead of top executives). Therefore, 
inventors play a crucial role in driving a firm’s innovation output. By focusing on inventors, we 
capture the key human capital in a firm. Second, we are able to track individual inventors’ patent 
filings and the corresponding patent assignees. As a result, we are able to observe inventors’ 
move from one firm to another, using information on patent assignees.1  These two unique 
features of our setting allow us to separate the contribution of firm organization capital and 
inventor human capital. Intuitively, if an individual inventor’s output does not change as she 
moves, the inventor is likely to be the main driver of her output. If, however, an individual 
                                                
1 Patents are typically assigned to the firm by which the inventor is employed.  
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inventor’s innovation output changes significantly after she moves from one firm to another, then 
we can largely attribute the change in her innovation output to the new firm she is joining.  
We begin our analysis by formally documenting innovation persistence in a framework 
that is different from Cohen et al. (2013). Taking advantage of patent inventor data, we find 
evidence on innovation persistence at both inventor and firm levels. Specifically, inventors with 
higher innovation output in the past tend to possess higher patent counts or citations in the future. 
For example, a one standard deviation increase in inventor patent filings in the current year is 
associated with a 12.8% increase in patent filings in the next year, and a one standard deviation 
increase in citations per patent in the current year is associated with 12.5% increase in citations 
per patent next year. Given the skewness in patent filings, the strength of persistence in 
innovation is sizable. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2013), we find firm-level innovation 
persistence as well. 
The above findings highlight the importance of inventors (as well as firms) in generating 
innovation output, and raise an important yet unanswered question ‒ the relative importance of 
inventors and firms. To isolate the roles played by inventors and firms, we use two methods. 
First, we focus on a panel of inventors who have changed their affiliated firms, and include 
inventor-, firm-, and year-fixed effects in the regressions. We refer to this approach as the mover 
dummy variable (henceforth MDV) method, which has been commonly used in the existing 
literature (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Graham, Li, and Qiu, 2012). Because the MDV 
approach is limited to movers (i.e., inventors who change their affiliated firms in our sample 
period) only, which accounts for 16% of all inventors in our sample, we use a second method. 
This approach includes both movers and stayers (i.e., inventors whose affiliated firms remain 
unchanged) in the sample, as long as the stayers are in the firms that employ at least one mover. 
This method is developed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (henceforth AKM) and later 
refined by Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002). The AKM method extends a rather small 
sample of movers to a connectedness sample, which includes 98.4% of all inventors in our 
setting. Both methods allow us to quantify how much of the observed heterogeneity in patent 
generation can be attributed to inventor fixed effects and firm fixed effects. The main results and 
their economic implications are similar regardless of the method we use.  
We investigate two dimensions of innovation output in this paper. The first dimension is 
innovation performance, measured by both the quantity and quality of a firm’s innovation output. 
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The second dimension is innovation “style”, measured by the exploratory score and exploitative 
score of a firm’s innovation output.2 We find that inventor fixed effects are consistently more 
important than firm fixed effects in explaining innovation performance. However, they are about 
the same important in explaining innovation style. Specifically, our estimates suggest that 
inventor fixed effects are about 6 times as important as firm fixed effects in explaining a firm’s 
innovation performance, while inventor fixed effects are about the same as important as firms 
fixed effects when explaining the firm’s innovation style. The results suggest that while inventor 
human capital is crucial in determining a firm’s innovation performance, its role on a firm’s 
innovation style is much more moderated.  
Furthermore, we find that the relative importance of inventor human capital to firm 
organizational capital exhibits significant heterogeneity in the cross section. First, we examine 
inventor network. The degree of an inventor’s centrality is determined by the number of coauthor 
relationships she has. Compared to an average inventor in terms of network centrality, better 
connected inventors contribute significantly more to innovation performance but not innovation 
style than firms do.  
Second, we investigate how the mobility of inventors in a firm alters our main results. 
High inventor turnovers in a firm could be a result of two driving forces. On the one hand, high 
inventor turnover may imply that these inventors are replaceable and hence firms’ organizational 
capital matters more. One the other hand, high inventor turnover could indicate that the firm 
implements high standards and pursues talented inventors, which induces larger inventor 
contribution to the firm’s innovation output. We find that the second effect dominates: Inventors 
in high mobility firms appear more important in determining innovation performance (but not 
style) compared to inventors in low mobility firms.  
Third, we explore industry heterogeneity and focus on industries in which innovation is 
more difficult to achieve. It is likely that in these industries inventor human capital plays a more 
dominanting role than firm organizational capital. We find that, in drug, chemical, computer, and 
electrical industries that are typically considered as high-tech industries, inventors are more 
crucial in driving innovation performance (but not style) than those in other industries.  
                                                
2 As defined in the existing literature (e.g., Levinthal and March, 1993; McGrath, 2001; Benner and Tushman, 2002; 
Smith and Tushman, 2005; Gao, et al., 2015), exploratory innovation is radical innovation that requires knowledge 
outside of the existing knowledge domain, and exploitative innovation is incremental innovation that builds on 
existing knowledge and improves existing skills, processes, and structures. 
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In the final part of the paper, we conduct a series of tests to address the concern that 
inventors’ endogenous moving across firms could bias our estimation. As the entire existing 
literature uses the moving of individuals (e.g., CEOs, venture capitalists, bankers, fund managers) 
to isolate the effects of human capital from organizational capital and there is not a method that 
can perfectly address the endogenous moving issue, we gauge the extent to which potential 
biases caused by endogenous moving could be. We first show that the firms to which inventors 
move are on average smaller, younger, and have worse operating performance than the firms 
from which inventors leave. We also find that movers are on average less productive than stayers. 
These results suggest that inventors’ moving is more likely to be involuntary (and hence 
exogenous) and their moving is likely to be caused by their own poor innovation productivity in 
the firms they leave. Hence, endogenous moving by inventors does not appear a major concern.  
Next, to the extent that endogenous moving still remains a concern, we gauge how much 
it would bias our main results. We first compare the relative importance of inventors and firms in 
a subsample that contains inventors who “move up” to a firm with better operating performance 
(hence the moving is more likely to be voluntary and endogenous) and in a subsample that 
contains inventors who “move down” to a firm with worse operating performance (hence the 
moving is more likely to be involuntary and exogenous). We find that the relative importance of 
inventors tofirms in explaining innovation performance is higher for moving-up inventors. 
However, the relative importance in explaining innovation style is similar across the two groups 
of inventors. The results suggest that, while there is some overestimation of firms’ contribution 
for moving-up inventors, endogenous moving by inventors does not appear to substantially alter 
our main results. 
To address the concern that firm organizational capital might be underestimated if 
inventors endogenously choose to move to similar firms in which they are less likely to 
experience changes in innovation output, we compare the relative importance of inventors and 
firms when inventors move to similar firms (i.e., with similar past operating performance or in 
the same industry) and when inventors move to firms that are very different from their current 
firms (i.e., firms with different past operating performance or in a different industry). We find 
that the relative importance of inventors to firms in explaining innovation performance and style 
is indeed higher in the firms whose inventors move to similar firms. Nonetheless, our results 
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from inventors who move to different types of firms once again suggest that our main findings 
are not entirely driven by inventors’ endogenous moving decisions. 
Finally, we examine the relative importance of inventors and firms in a subsample that is 
less likely to be subject to the matching concern. Endogenous matching between inventors and 
firms could cause us to wrongly attribute the change in the inventor’s output to firm 
organizational capital, where the change actually comes from an interaction between the inventor 
and the firm. In other words, matching might contaminate our estimation of the relative 
importance of the inventor and the firm. To address this concern, we follow Graham, Li, and Qiu 
(2012) and focus on a subsample of movers who exhibit little changes in their innovation output 
as they move across firms. The rationale of this test is that these movers are less likely to be 
subject to endogenous matching issues. Our main findings continue to hold in this test.  
While we have performed a rich set of tests to assess the degree of potential biases caused 
by endogenous moving to the best we can, one caveat is that we cannot completely rule out the 
matching concern due to inventors’ endogenous moving. This issue is unfortunately a common 
challenge that the existing strand of labor and finance literature faces. While our main findings – 
human capital plays a more important role in explaining innovation performance and a relatively 
less important role in explaining innovation style – survive a rich set of robustness tests, one still 
needs to be cautious when interpreting or generalizing our results.   
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, our paper contributes to the literature on 
the economics of organization. This literature proposes different hypotheses for the existence of 
the firm and distinguishes physical capital from human capital (Coase, 1988; Klein, 1988; 
Williamson and Winter, 1993). An empirical study by Kaplan et al. (2009) examines startup 
companies and suggests that business (nonhuman capital) is more important than management 
team (human capital). Different from their work, our paper focuses on established firms and 
highlight the importance of human capital in patent generation in these firms. One plausible 
reason for our different results is that we explore established firms that are very different in 
nature and many other aspects from startup companies. Hence, our paper supplements Kaplan et 
al. (2009).  
Second, our paper contributes to the innovation literature by documenting the importance 
of inventors’ human capital in explaining innovation performance and style. To the best of our 
knowledge, our paper is the first one that attempts to isolate the contribution of inventor human 
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capital from firm organizational capital in determining a firm’s innovation output. Prior studies 
have examined various determinants of innovation, including legal environment (Acharya et al., 
2014), banking competition (Cornaggia et al., 2015), financial market development (Hsu et al., 
2014), institutional ownership (Aghion et al., 2013), product market competition (Aghion et al., 
2005), etc. However, these studies only explore on the extensive margin regarding the 
determinants of firm-level innovation output. In this paper, we delve further into the intensive 
margin and decompose innovation drivers into human-capital- and organization-capital-related 
components, which allow us to further understand the relative importance of these two 
components in a firm’s patent generation.   
Third, this paper contributes to the expanding literature that attempts to separate human 
capital and organizational capital. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) find that individual 
effects are more important than firm effects in explaining wage variations in France. Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003) and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) show that manager fixed effects explain a 
significant extent of firm policy heterogeneity, and managers with higher performance fixed 
effects receive higher compensation. Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) find that venture 
capitalists have repeatable skills and VC partner’s human capital is more important than VC 
firm’s organizational capital in explaining performance. Berk, Binsbergen, and Liu (2014) stress 
the role of mutual fund firms in efficiently allocating capital to their managers. Cho et al. (2016) 
find that firms are more important than managers in driving patent generation.3 Existing studies, 
however, are either unable to capture individuals’ output in the setting of workers or firm/fund 
managers, or have to infer individuals’ output through indirect ways (such as in the VC partner 
setting). In this paper, we are able to directly track individual inventor output by using patents 
filed by each one of them. This unique feature of inventor/patent data provides a clean setting to 
test our conjectures and enables us to analyze individual inventors’ performance and style.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and variable 
constructions. Section 3 documents firm innovation persistence. Section 4 reports the main 
results. Section 5 presents subsample results that explore the heterogeneity of our main findings. 
Section 6 addresses concerns on inventors’ endogenous moving. Section 7 concludes and 
discusses potential caveats of our results. 
                                                
3 Cho et al. (2016)’s findings are likely driven by the fact that mangers are not the main drivers of patent generation. 
While the executives may set the boundaries for the R&D group, the exact innovation directions and outputs are 
determined by the knowledge and expertise possessed by inventors in the firm. 
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2. Data  
2.1 Sample construction 
We begin with the latest version of the Harvard Business School (HBS) patent and 
inventor database available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/patent. 4 The HBS patent and 
inventor database provides information for both inventors (the individuals who receive credit for 
producing the patent) and assignees (the entity that owns the patents, which could be a 
government, a firm, an organization, or an individual).  
For the purpose of our study, we need to track the employer of an inventor as she moves 
from one firm to another. Since patent database does not directly indicate the employment of an 
inventor, we assume that the employer of the inventor is the company to which the patent (filed 
by the inventor) is assigned. There is a clear identification of the employer if a patent is only 
assigned to one assignee. However, when a patent is assigned to multiple assignees, the HBS 
patent and inventor database only reports the primary assignee of the patent. This issue 
confounds the identification of the employer of the inventor. To overcome this problem, we 
match the HBS patent and inventor database with the National Bureau of Economics Research 
(NBER) Patent Citation database that contains precise patent and assignee information.5 We 
discuss in more details regarding how to pin down the employer for each inventor when there are 
multiple assignees in Appendix A.  
To obtain time-varying firm characteristics, we merge the inventor-year patent sample 
with the firm-level annual accounting variables obtained from Compustat. We require all firms to 
have non-missing financial records across our sample period. Finally, we omit observations 
before 1970 (i.e., 345 observations), which are only a small portion of our final sample. Our final 
sample consists of 204,678 inventors (1,246,951 inventor-year observations) that have worked 
for 5,722 firms from 1970 to 2003.6 
 
2.2 Variable measurement 
2.2.1 Measuring Innovation  
                                                
4 See Li et al. (2014) and Singh and Fleming (2010) for more details about the HBS patent and inventor database. 
5 This database is available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads. See Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001) for more details about the NBER patent citation database.  
6 The time span of our inventor sample ends in 2003 because we construct the innovation metrics three years ahead 
in our analysis to capture the long-term nature of innovation activity. 
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We construct two sets of patent-based metrics to gauge an inventor’s innovation output. 
The first set measures innovation performance and the second set captures innovation style. 
Following the innovation literature, one measure in the first set is the total number of patents 
filed and eventually granted in a given year by an inventor, which captures the quantity of her 
innovation output. We use the application year instead of the grant year to determine an 
inventor’s innovation output because the patent application year is closer to the actual time when 
innovation activities take place (Griliches, Pakes, and Hall, 1988; Griliches, 1990). Although the 
intuition is straightforward and it is easy to construct, a simple measure of patent counts hardly 
distinguishes breakthrough innovations from incremental technological discoveries (Trajtenberg, 
1990). Hence, we construct another metric of innovation output, the total number of non-self 
citations each patent receives in subsequent years. We use this measure to capture the quality (or 
the impact) of an inventor’s innovation output.  
Nevertheless, both innovation measures suffer from severe truncation problems. Because 
in our matched sample we only observe patents that are eventually granted by the end of 2006, 
patents filed in the last few years may still be under review and not granted by 2006 (this 
truncation problem is mainly caused by using the NBER database which is updated till 2006). To 
adjust the truncation bias in patent counts, we calculate the number of patents filed by each 
inventor (and eventually granted) of a given year in the HBS database, which contains patents 
granted through 2010. To the extent that the patent application outcomes have been announced 
by 2010 for the patents filed by 2006, this approach greatly alleviates the patent truncation 
concern. However, patents tend to receive citations over a long period after its grant date, but we 
observe the citations received up to 2010. To deal with this truncation bias, we correct the 
citation data by using the “weight factors” following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) 
and estimating the shape of the citation-lag distribution.  
Consistent with the innovation literature, the distribution of patent grants in our final 
sample is right skewed, with its median at zero. Due to the right skewness of patent counts and 
citations per patent, we use the natural logarithm of one plus patent counts (LnPatent) and the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of citations per patent (LnCitePat) as the main 
innovation metrics to measure innovation performance in our analysis. We also winsorize all our 
dependent variables at the 99th percentile. 
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The second set of metrics includes patents’ exploitative (Exploit) and exploratory scores 
(Explore), which reflect an inventor’s innovation style. We follow existing literature (e.g., 
Sorensen and Stuart, 2000; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; etc.) to categorize an inventor’s patenting 
activity into exploratory innovation and exploitative innovation. The basic idea is that inventors 
concentrating on their existing knowledge are expected to produce more exploitative patents 
while inventors exploring new ideas are expected to create more exploratory patents. We define 
an inventor’s existing knowledge as her previous patent portfolio and the set of patents that has 
been cited by her own patents over the past five years. We then construct proxies so that a patent 
is classified as being exploitative if at least 60% of its citations are based on existing knowledge, 
and a patent is classified as being exploratory if at least 60% of its citations are based on new 
knowledge.7 We then set Exploit equal to the ratio of the number of exploitative patents filed by 
an inventor in a given year to the total number of patents filed by the same inventor in the same 
year. In a similar way, we define Explore by the ratio of the number of exploratory patents for a 
given year to the total number of patents filed by the inventor in the same year.  
Note that the patent databases used in our study are unlikely to be affected by 
survivorship bias. As long as a patent application is eventually granted, the patent is attributed to 
the applying firm at the time of application even if the firm later gets acquired or goes bankrupt. 
Moreover, because patent citations are attributed to the patent rather than the assignee, the patent 
granted to a firm that later gets acquired or goes bankrupt can still keep receiving citations long 
after the firm disappears.  
For firm characteristics, we compute all variables for firm i in fiscal year t. Our control 
variables include firm size (the natural logarithm of book value assets), firm age (the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s age since its IPO year), profitability (ROA), investments in intangible 
assets (R&D expenditures over total assets), asset tangibility (net PPE scaled by total assets), 
leverage, capital expenditures, growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q), financial constraints (Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997)’s five-variable KZ index), and industry concentration (the Herfindahl index 
based on sales). Aghion et al. (2005) point out the non-linear effect of product market 
competition on innovation output. Hence, we include the squared Herfindahl index in our 
regressions. We provide detailed variable definitions in the Appendix B. 
 
                                                
7 We use 80% as a cutoff, too. The results are robust to using variables that are defined by this alternative cutoff.  
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2.2.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents information on the movers and stayers in our sample. Panel A shows 
that during the sample period, 15.9% of (or 32,561) inventors are movers who work in more than 
one firm in the sample, while the rest 84.1% are non-movers who work in the same sample firm 
throughout our sample period. Panel B provides information on the proportion of firms that have 
a given number of movers during the sample period. 24.7% of the sample firms do not have any 
movers while the remaining 75.3% of firms have at least one mover. According to the AKM 
method, we are able to identify the fixed effects of inventors who work in these 4,310 firms 
regardless of whether they are movers or stayers, which constitutes the connectedness sample. In 
the robustness check, we perform the MDV analysis on the mobility sample, which comprises of 
32,561 movers as well as 4,310 firms at which these movers are employed.  
 
2.2.3 Measuring control variables 
Following the innovation literature, we control for a vector of inventor and firm 
characteristics that may affect innovation output. For inventor time-varying characteristics, we 
create proxies for inventors’ prior innovation experience. Two variables, LnExpnum and 
LnExpcit, are defined as the logarithm of one plus the innovation metrics (adjusted patent count 
and citations per patent, respectively) over the past three years. We use a three-year rolling 
window because recent experience is a good indicator that the inventor is an active participant in 
innovation (Chemmanur, Ertugrul, and Krishnan, 2015). The construction of these variables 
requires information on the past three years’ invention experience, and hence we exclude the first 
three-year observations for all inventors because their prior innovation experience is missing. We 
also exclude the inventors whose moving happens in the first three years in our sample period so 
that we can keep the mobility structure intact. 
To minimize the effect of outliers, we winsorize all control variables at the 1st and 99th   
percentiles. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables in both the full sample and the 
connectedness sample, which examines whether the connectedness sample is representative of 
the full sample (Brav et al., 2005).8 Panel A summarizes the representativeness of these variables 
                                                
8 When using Exploit and Explore indices as dependent variables in the baseline regression, the sample size is 
different since we assign a missing value for an inventor of a year in the case that no patent was filed by him or her. 
We provide summary statistics of Exploit and Explore for both the full sample and the connectedness sample in the 
online appendix. 
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for inventors. On average, an inventor in the sample has 0.9 granted patents per year and each 
patent receives 6.5 citations. In the connectedness sample, an inventor has a similar number of 
patents granted per year, 0.9, and each patent receives 6.5 citations. The other variables that 
measure how exploratory or exploitative an inventor could be are also very close in both the full 
sample and the connectedness sample.  
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the representativeness of these variables for firms. In the 
full sample, an average firm has book value assets of $7.12 billion, R&D-to-assets ratio of 5.9%, 
ROA of 11.5%, PPE-to-assets ratio of 29.8%, leverage of 22.2%, capital expenditure ratio of 
6.8%, Tobin’s Q of 1.9, and is 21.9 years old since its IPO date. In the connectedness sample, 
these statistics are quite close: an average firm has book value assets of $7.57 billion, R&D-to-
assets ratio of 6.0%, ROA of 12.1%, PPE-to-assets ratio of 29.9%, leverage of 22.0%, capital 
expenditure ratio of 6.9%, Tobin’s Q of 1.9, and is 22.4 years old since its IPO date. Overall, 
these comparisons allow us to infer that our connectedness sample is representative of the 
universe of inventors and firms in the full sample. 
 
3. PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE OF INVENTORS AND FIRMS  
Persistence has been documented on various dimensions such as capital structure (e.g. 
Denis, 2012; Leary and Roberts, 2005, etc.), operating performance (Denis and McKeon, 2016), 
and venture capital performance (Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf, 2015). Performance persistence 
implies that past performance can predict future outcomes in our setting. Thus, we concentrate 
on the relation between the inventor’s or firm’s past performance and their achievement of the 
current year. Our conjecture is that they would perform better at current year if they had better 
performance in the past. To gauge the performance of inventors and firms, we mainly focus on 
the number of patents filed and corresponding patent citations each year. We evaluate the 
inventor’s and firm’s performance history based on two measures: the cross-sectional ranking of 
their performance each year and patent counts or citations per patent each year.  
Simple regressions would be subject to the concern that poor-performing inventors or 
firms are more likely to drop from the sample and hence what one observes in the data is just 
those who survive. In such cases, this approach would lead to misleading conclusions of positive 
performance persistence. To address this concern, in our regressions we only consider those 
inventors and firms with long span in our sample. As a result, it’s unlikely that their performance 
12 
 
persistence is attributed to pure luck that cannot last for a long time. In particular, we focus on 
the set of inventors who have at least 10-year observations and the set of firms that have at least 
5-year observations in our sample.9 Therefore, our performance persistence tests are based on 
inventors and firms that have appeared in our sample for a long time. 
We construct two performance measures in this test. The first measure is relative 
performance ranking, we create a dummy variable that equals one if the inventor or firm is in the 
top quartile in terms of the number of filed patents (or patent citations) each year and zero 
otherwise. 10 The second measure is the direct count of patent numbers (or patent citations) filed 
by inventors or firms each year. A feature of the direct counting is that it’s not stationary because 
in most years a lot of inventors in our sample have no patent filed. To overcome the 
nonstationarity problem, we use the past t years’ average number of filed patent (or patent 
citations) to predict the current year’s number of patents (or patent citations) they file and check 
whether persistence emerges in this specification. 
 
3.1 Persistence in rankings 
Table 3 reports the results of pooled regressions that regress inventor (Panels A and B) 
and firm (Panels C and D) relative rankings at the current year on those t year ago, Top_t (where 
t = 1, 2, or 3). Panels A and C report the results with patent counts while Panels B and D report 
the results with patent citations. In inventor regressions, controls include both year and 
individual fixed effects. In firm regressions, we include all financial controls for firms described 
in Appendix A as well as year and firm fixed effects.  
The coefficient estimates on Top_t are positive and significant at the 1 % level in all 
columns, suggesting a strong, positive relation between the inventor’s (and the firm’s) past and 
current performance ranking. For example, in Panel A, column (1) suggests that for an inventor 
who is in the top quartile one year ago, she is 13.1% more likely to stay in the top quartile in 
terms of patent counts in the current year, compared to inventors who are not in the top quartile 
one year ago. This result remains robust after we include Top_2 or Top_3 in the regressions. 
Similarly, according to our results in columns (2) and (3) of Panel A, an inventor who is in the 
top quantile 2 years (3 years) ago, they are 8.5% (2.9%) more likely to keep in the top quartile in 
                                                
9 The results are qualitatively similar if we use alternative cutoffs (e.g., 8 or 12 years for inventors, 4 or 6 years for 
firms) when selecting the samples. 
10 Our results are quite similar if we use top percentile, top quintile, or top tercile to define the ranking dummy. 
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terms of patent counts in the current year. In Panel B, when we use patent citations, our main 
results continue to hold. Panel C reports firm performance persistence results in terms of patent 
counts. The coefficient estimates on Top_t are all positive and significant. The economic 
magnitude is sizeable as well. For example, column (1) suggests that a firm that is in the top 
quartile in terms of patent counts one year again is 40.3% more likely to stay in the top quartile 
in the current. Panel D reports similar findings when we alternatively use a firm’s ranking in 
terms of patent citations.  
One potential concern is that inventors and firms operating in different industries might 
not be comparable in terms of patent counts and citations because patenting might be easier in 
some industries than that in others. To alleviate this concern, we define our top quartile inventors 
and firms within the industry in each year and repeat all our tests. The results are similar to those 
reported in Table 3.  
 
3.2 Persistence in counts 
In this subsection, we use alternative measures, patent counts and citations (as opposed to 
rankings), and explore whether the positive performance persistence remains. As we mentioned 
earlier, the number of filed patents is not a stationary series. To address this issue, we calculate 
NPat_t (where t = 1, 2, 3, or 4) as the average number of filed patents among previous t years by 
an inventor (firm). 11 Also, to avoid serial correlations of error terms in overlapping sample 
regressions, we construct a non-overlapping sample in the sense that we move our event 
windows accordingly without overlapping observation for inventors (firms). 
 Table 4 reports our regression results. The coefficient estimates on NPat_t are positive 
and significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4) of Panel A, which suggests a positive 
correlation between an inventor’s past average number of filed patents and current patent counts. 
We obtain a similar result on inventor performance persistence in terms of patent citations, as 
Panel B shows. Regarding the results on firm performance persistence, Panels C and D report the 
results. The coefficient estimates on NPat_t are positive and significant in all columns, 
suggesting that a firm’s past patent counts (and citations) could predict its current innovation 
output. 
                                                
11 At the firm level, the nonstationarity property of patent variables might not hold. For consistency, however, we 
run regressions by exploiting the identical method as we do with the inventor data.  
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4. Main results 
 Having formally documented innovation persistence at both the firm and inventor level, 
in this section, we explore the relative importance of firm organizational capital and inventor 
human capital that contributes to a firm’s innovation output.  
 
4.1 Empirical methods 
Our empirical tests relate inventor and firm characteristics in the current year to the 
metrics of innovation output three years ahead in view of the long-term nature of innovation 
process. We estimate the following linear model of inventors’ innovation 𝑌"#(%&'): 
                      𝑌"#(%&') = 𝛽+𝑋"% + 𝛽.𝑍#% + 𝛾"% + 𝜙" + 𝜃# + 𝜇% + 𝜖"#%                                (1) 
where 𝑖 denotes inventor, 𝑗 denotes firm, and 𝑡 denotes year when the innovation activity occurs. 
In the above equation,	𝑋"% and 𝑍#% include time-varying controls for inventor and firm. The time-
varying controls at the firm level include firm asset size, R&D expenditure, age, profitability 
(measured by ROA), tangible assets (measured by PPE), leverage, capital expenditure, Tobin’s Q, 
financial constraints, and product market competition. The time-varying controls at the inventor 
level include inventors’ previous innovation performance (measured by patent counts and 
citations per patent in previous three years). 𝜇% captures the year fixed effects. 𝛾"% controls for the 
functional area effects that inventor 𝑖 belongs in year t. We define the functional area for an 
inventor as the primary functional class of most patents that inventor i applies for in year t. 12  
Our focus is to retrieve both inventor and firm fixed effects 𝜙"  and 𝜃#  using movements of 
inventors across firms.  
We use a method first proposed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (hereafter 
referred to as AKM method) and later refined by Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002). The 
AKM method allows us to separate firm and inventor fixed effects in a connectedness sample, 
which includes not only moving inventors but also non-movers who work in firms that have 
hired at least one mover. To define a connectedness sample, we use graph theory to determine 
groups of inventors and firms that are connected. Detailed procedures are as follow: We start 
                                                
12 The patent classes are based on the USPTO 3-digit classification system as of 2006. We assign the class of the 
largest number of patents that inventor i applies for in year t as his/her primary functional area. We supplement the 
functional area of inventor i with the class of the largest number of patents the firm (he/she works for) filed in year t 
if the inventor does not apply for any patent of that year. Similarly, for firms with no patents filed, we assign the 
functional area of the firm as its industry functional area (very few in our sample). 
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with an arbitrary inventor and track all firms where she has ever worked. Then we include all 
inventors whoever work in these firms into our connectedness sample and continue tracking all 
firms for which these inventors have ever worked. We repeat the procedure until all data are 
exhausted.13 Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) show that connections make the estimation of 
inventor and firm fixed effects for each connected group relative to a within-group benchmark 
computationally feasible. To make inventor and firm fixed effects directly comparable across 
groups, we follow the normalization procedure suggested by Cornelissen (2008): First, we 
normalize the mean firm fixed effects for each group to zero and add the group mean firm fixed 
effects to inventor fixed effects; Second, we subtract the grand mean of inventor fixed effects 
from each inventor fixed effect and then add this grand mean inventor fixed effect to the 
intercept. 
An analogous method (i.e., the MDV method) proposed by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
employs the mobility sample consisting of only movers and firms for which they work to 
separate firm fixed effects from individual fixed effects, using the LSDV approach. One 
disadvantage of the MDV method compared to the AKM method is a potential sample selection 
bias resulting from the restriction of the sample to only movers who could be different from non-
movers. Besides what we mentioned above, there are some other important benefits of adopting 
the AKM framework. First, the AKM method uses information of both movers and non-movers, 
which gives us a larger sample size and higher statistical power. Second, it can significantly 
reduce the computational work in terms of the large data set used in our study. Nonetheless, we 
conduct the MDV approach in our analysis as a robustness check 
We now provide a detailed discussion on how the AKM method separately identifies 
inventor and firm fixed effects in the connectedness sample. Define the variable 𝐷":%  as a 
dummy that equals one if inventor 𝑖 works at firm 𝑘 at time 𝑡 and zero otherwise. Then we can 
rewrite equation (1) as: 
      𝑌"#(%&') = 𝛽+𝑋"% + 𝛽.𝑍#% + 𝛾"% + 𝜙" + 𝐷":%𝜃:<:=+ + 𝜇% + 𝜖"#%.                    (2) 
                                                
13 In most of our analyses, we use Cornelissen’s (2008) Stata command “felsdvreg” to implement the AKM method 
and estimate both inventor and firm fixed effects. This command facilitates the estimation of a linear model with 
two high-dimensional fixed effects (i.e., inventor and firm fixed effects) by using a memory-saving decomposition 
of the design matrix. It also provides useful summary statistics. In some situations with tremendous data size, we 
switch to the Stata command “reghdfe” proposed by Correia (2014), which is more efficient when dealing with data 
that requires large memory. 
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In the first step, the AKM approach sweeps out the inventor fixed effects by averaging 
over all inventor 𝑖’s innovation performance to obtain: 
                           𝑌" = 𝛽+𝑋" + 𝛽.𝑍" + 𝛾" + 𝜙" + 𝐷":𝜃:<:=+ + 𝜇% + 𝜖".                            (3) 
Here 𝑌"  is inventor 𝑖’s average innovation performance across the full sample period. 
Then we begin to demean (2) with (3) in order to get: 𝑌"#(%&') − 𝑌" = 𝛽+ 𝑋"% − 𝑋" + 𝛽. 𝑍#% − 𝑍" + (𝛾"% − 𝛾") + (𝐷":% − 𝐷":)𝜃:<:=+ + 𝜇% − 𝜇% +𝜖"#% − 𝜖" .                                                                                                                                      (4) 
Through demeaning process the inventor fixed effects have been removed. Now it’s clear 
that we are able to exploit movers’ information to identify firm fixed effects since 𝐷":% − 𝐷": ≠0 for a mover, which can be estimated by the LSDV method. Finally, using the estimates in the 
above regression, we can recover the inventor fixed effects by the following equation: 
                                        𝜙" = 𝑌" − 𝛽+𝑋" − 𝛽.𝑍" − 𝛾" − 𝐷":𝜃:<:=+                                 (5) 
and here 𝜇% is often treated as the benchmark in estimating time effects and thereby assumed to 
be zero. 
As Abowd et al. (2004) and Andrews et al. (2008) note, an estimation bias may emerge 
when inventor mobility is limited, which could lead to imprecise estimation of inventor and firm 
fixed effects. Consequently, we need to be cautious when interpreting the results in both the 
MDV and AKM methods. However, this issue is not severe in our study because our sample 
contains about 16% movers. This proportion is pretty high compared to previous literature (e.g. 
Graham, Li, and Qiu, 2012). Another property of the AKM estimator is that fixed effect 
estimates themselves have properties that are similar to other estimators. As shown by 
Wooldridge (2010), the estimates of the time-varying variable coefficients are both unbiased and 
consistent, while the fixed effect estimates are only unbiased.  
  
4.2 Baseline results 
In this section, we analyze how unobserved inventor and firm time invariant 
characteristics affect inventors’ innovation performance and style using the AKM method. The 
AKM method uses the connectedness sample that excludes firms that do not have a mover 
during our sample period. Based on this procedure, the connectedness sample for innovation 
performance has 201,461 inventors (32,561 movers), 4,310 firms, and 1,239,614 inventor-year 
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observations, which accounts for 98% of all inventors, 75% of all firms, and 99% of all 
observation units.14 
We follow the prior literature to select the observable characteristics of inventors and 
firms that may affect an inventor’s future innovation output (e.g., He and Tian, 2013; Seru, 2014; 
Cornaggia et al., 2015.). Specifically, in our full fixed effects model we regress the proxy of 
inventors’ innovation performance on both firm time-varying variables, such as firm size, age, 
profitability, intangible assets, and on inventor time-varying variables, such as prior experience 
of an inventor. Additionally, we include year fixed effects to capture the impact of economic 
conditions. 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using the AKM method in the 
connectedness sample. We suppress all coefficient estimates and focus on the relative economic 
importance of time-invariant inventor and firm characteristics. Following Graham, Li, and Qiu 
(2012) and Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015), we use BCD(E,GHDIH%CJ		KL)DMJ(E)  to capture the contribution 
of inventor fixed effects to the total variation in inventors’ innovation output.  BCD(E,GHDIH%CJ	KL)DMJ(E)  
reports the covariance of the dependent variable with inventor fixed effects, scaled by the 
dependent variable’s variance. These normalized covariance term represents the fractions of total 
variations attributable to particular factors, which can effectively capture the relative importance 
of individual fixed effects in explaining the dependent variable for a given regression model. In 
addition, we report adjusted R-squared across four different model specifications in Table 5: the 
first specification includes all control variables and year effects; the second specification 
includes all control variables, year effects, and firm fixed effects; the third specification includes 
all control variables, year fixed effects, and inventor fixed effects; the final specification includes 
all control variables and all fixed effects. We adopt adjusted R-squares in this case because the 
number of explanatory variables changes across models. 
For patent counts in column 1, inventor fixed effects account for 53.1% of the total 
variation while firm fixed effects contribute to 8.4% of the total variation (the left portion is 
attributable to all other controls). The relative importance of inventor fixed effects compared to 
firm fixed effects is measured by the ratio of the contribution of these two fixed effects, which is 
                                                
14 The final connected sample that enters into AKM estimation is 201,803 inventors and 4,294 firms. It is because 
functional area effects are missing for some of the inventors.  
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around 6 times in column 1. For citations per patent in column 2, 62.2% of the total variation 
corresponds to inventor fixed effects while 7.2% of the total variation corresponds to firm fixed 
effects. The relative importance between inventor and firm fixed effects amounts to about 8 
times. Overall, the stark differences in explanatory power between inventor and firm fixed 
effects for patent counts and citations per patent reflect that innovation performance is largely 
driven by inventor fixed effects. These results show the important role of inventors’ inherent 
ability or time invariant characteristics, compared to firms’ time invariant characteristics, in 
shaping innovation output. 
 In columns 3 and 4, we examine exploitative and exploratory scores to gauge innovation 
style. The results show that the relative importance between inventor and firm fixed effects is 
about 1.4 in column 3 and about 1.3 in column 4, which indicates that the explanatory power of 
inventor fixed effects and firm fixed effects is very close in explaining innovation style. The 
result suggests that the firm’s organizational capital has a relatively more important impact on 
innovation style than innovation performance. While inventors appear to be able to carry their 
innovation ability to the new firm they move to, their innovation style is more likely to be 
affected by the new environment they get into. Table 5 also reports the F-statistics for the joint 
significance of both fixed effects and the significance of fixed effects for inventor or firm 
individually. They all consistently reject the null that these coefficient estimates are jointly zero. 
The explanatory power of all control variables except for inventor fixed effects and year 
fixed effects vary with different dependent variables: 35.4% for patent counts, 21.3% for 
citations per patent, 11.7% for the exploitative score and 15.6% for the exploratory score. 
Including inventor (or firm) fixed effects increases the adjusted R-squared. For example, adding 
firm fixed effects increases the adjusted R-squared by 1.9 percentage points while adding 
inventor fixed effects increases the adjusted R-squared by 8.4 percentage points when dependent 
variable is LnPatent. The extent of adjusted R-squared increment corresponding to inventor (or 
firm) fixed effects is consistent with our results on the relative importance of inventor and firm 
fixed effects above. For the example of LnPatent, the ratio of the increment of adjusted R-
squared when including inventor fixed effects to the increment of adjusted R-squared when 
including firm fixed effects is about 4.4, which is close to our estimates above. 
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
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In this subsection, we conduct additional tests to check the robustness of our baseline 
findings.15  
First, we implement the MDV method used in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) by restricting 
the sample to the mobility sample in which only inventors who move across firms are included. 
The mobility sample includes 32,420 movers (21,133 movers when using Exploit and Explore 
indices as dependent variables) as well as 4,294 (3,249 firms when using Exploit and Explore 
indices as dependent variables) firms for which they work. Note that the number of firms in the 
mobility sample equals that in the connectedness sample because only firms with movers can be 
identified no matter we use the AKM or MDV method. 
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results using the MDV method. The inventor fixed effects 
continue to explain a significant portion of innovation performance. Specifically, inventor fixed 
effects have almost 4 times more explanatory power than firm fixed effects when using 
innovation performance measures (patent counts and citations per patent) as the dependent 
variable, which is consistent with the big gap of the explanatory power between inventor and 
firm fixed effects in our baseline regressions. In terms of the innovation style variables (Exploit 
and Explore), the contribution of inventor fixed effects is similar to that of firm fixed effects in 
explaining the total variation as the ratio turns to be about 0.7, which is also consistent with our 
main results. Although the relative contribution between inventor and firm fixed effects is 
different when using the AKM method and the MDV method (e.g., changing from 6.3 to 4.7 
when LnPatent is used, from 1.4 to 0.7 when Exploit is used), the main economic messages are 
the same with either the MDV method or the AKM method: inventors are way more important 
than firms when explaining innovation performance but inventors play a similar important role 
with firms when explaining innovation style. In fact, as detailed in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012), 
such a change in the relative contribution between inventor and firm fixed effects with two 
methods is the result of sample difference and normalization procedure. The incremental change 
in adjusted R-squared across different model specifications with the mobility sample is also 
consistent with our earlier findings reported in Table 5. 
Second, we conduct another robust test using the AKM method on the largest group of 
the connectedness sample. A noted issue in the AKM method is that fixed effects are identified 
relative to a benchmark within each group. To ensure all fixed effects are comparable across 
                                                
15 More additional robustness tests and supplemental analyses are provided in Internet Appendix.  
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groups in the connectedness sample, we follow Cornelissen (2008) to normalize both inventor 
and firm fixed effects. Nevertheless, there remains an issue regarding the change of the relative 
explanatory power of inventor and firm fixed effects as the normalization procedure re-weights 
the between-group explanatory power. To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate all our 
regressions using the largest group of the connectedness sample only and thereby normalization 
is not required. Moreover, the largest group is composed of 32,450 movers, 168,566 stayers, 
4,130 firms, and 1,237,555 inventor-year observations, which account for 99% of inventors, 96% 
of firms, and 99% of inventor-year observations of the connectedness sample, respectively. This  
sample grants a great power to mitigate the bias caused by normalization. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results using the largest group, and the results are 
qualitatively similar to what we obtained in the baseline regressions. We reexamine the relative 
importance of inventor and firm fixed effects in determining inventors’ innovation performance 
and innovation style. The AKM results using LnPatent and LnCitePat as the dependent variable 
from the largest group show that the ratio of inventor fixed effects’ contribution to firm fixed 
effects’ contribution in explaining total variation is about 6 times. When using Exploit and 
Explore as the dependent variable to measure innovation style, the relative contribution between 
inventors and firms is about 1.4 times. All F-statistics for the joint significance of both fixed 
effects and the significance of fixed effects for inventor or firm individually consistently reject 
the null. We also report the adjusted R-squared of the AKM method in all four columns. Overall, 
these additional tests suggest that our results in the baseline regressions are robust. 
 
4.4 Heterogeneity in inventor fixed effects 
So far, we have shown that inventor-specific effects explain a significant fraction of the 
variation in innovation performance and style. Additionally, we would like to assess how big 
these observed differences among inventors are. Therefore, we look at the distributions of 
inventor fixed effects. We plot the density distribution function of estimated inventor fixed 
effects using four different dependent variables. Because fixed effects are estimated relative to a 
benchmark, the location and the mean of the estimated fixed effects may vary when using 
different benchmarks. So we demean inventor fixed effects in all our figures without changing 
the shape of the distribution function. 
In Figure 1, we plot four distributions in Panels A to D that correspond to the retrieved 
21 
 
inventor fixed effects with different dependent variables. Panels A and B of Figure 1 plot the 
estimated inventor fixed effects distributions when using metrics of innovation performance 
(LnPatent and LnCitePat) as the dependent variables. Both distributions are slightly right skewed 
and this observation is consistent with the fact that patent count and citation data is right skewed 
due to the fact that many inventors file no patents in some years. Our results differ from many 
prior studies that find individual fixed effects to be roughly normally distributed (e.g. Graham, Li, 
and Qiu, 2012; Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf, 2015) because of a unique feature of invention: 
innovation, especially high-quality innovation, is mainly driven by a few inventors with great 
talent or inherent characteristics. It’s also noteworthy that the distribution of estimated inventor 
fixed effects in terms of citations per patent (Panel B) has higher dispersion and fatter tails than 
those of estimated inventor fixed effects in terms of patent counts (Panel A). This observation 
indicates that time-invariant characteristics of inventors in determining the quality of innovations 
are much more dispersed than those of inventors in shaping the number of patents. This estimate 
contributes to a large literature on innovation skill dispersion and productivity, and could help 
parameterize models that proxy for variation in innovation skills (e.g., Iranzo, Schivardi, and 
Tosetti, 2006; Bombardini, Gallipoli, and Pupato, 2012).  
In Figure 1 Panels C and D, we plot the distributions of estimated inventor fixed effects 
using the metrics of innovation style (Exploit and Explore) as the dependent variable. Compared 
with Panels A and B, both distributions in Panels C and D are more concentrated, which show 
that there is a smaller difference in inventors’ time invariant characteristics that determine their 
innovation style than that determine their innovation performance. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects in the largest group, which has a similar shape 
with Figure 1. 
For a more precise assessment of the dispersion of inventor fixed effects, we tabulate the 
distribution of retrieved inventor fixed effects from the AKM regressions in Table 7. We show 
median, standard deviation, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile in both Panel A and Panel B, in 
which Panel A shows the distribution of inventor fixed effects in the connectedness sample and 
Panel B shows the distribution of inventor fixed effects in the largest group.  
Overall, Table 7 shows that the variation in the size of inventor fixed effects is 
economically large. To highlight some examples, row 1 of Panel A shows that the difference 
between an inventor at the 25th percentile of the distribution on the natural logarithm of patent 
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counts and the one at the 75th percentile of the distribution is 0.33. The difference is equivalent to 
0.32 patents, which is 36% of our patent count sample mean (0.91). In terms of the natural 
logarithm of citations per patent, row 2 of Panel A shows that the difference between an inventor 
at the 25th percentile and one at the 75th percentile is 0.694. The difference is equivalent to 0.90 
citations per patent, which accounts for 14% of the average citations per patent in the sample 
(6.48).   
For the exploitative score in row 3 of Panel A, the difference between an inventor in the 
25th percentile and that in the 75th percentile is 0.12. The economic effect is large given that the 
average exploitative score in our sample is 0.13. Finally, for the exploratory score in the last row 
of Panel A, the difference between an inventor in the 25th percentile and an inventor in the 75th 
percentile is 0.23, which is sizable given that the average exploratory score in the sample is 0.75. 
 
5. Heterogeneity in the cross section 
In this section, we conduct cross-sectional analysis in the full fixed effects model to 
better understand how inventor and firm heterogeneity alters our baseline results. These cross-
sectional tests provide additional insights on how relative importance of inventors and firms 
would change in response to different inventor and firm characteristics. 
 
5.1 Inventor centrality  
In this subsection we examine whether inventors are more important in firms with more 
“key” inventors. We define whether an inventor is a key one based on her normalized degree of 
centrality in the universe of inventor co-authorship network. Following Hochberg, Ljungqvist, 
and Lu (2007), we calculate an inventor’s normalized degree of centrality each year, which 
equals the number of coauthor relationships in the past three years an inventor has in the network 
divided by the maximum possible coauthor relationships in the past three years one can have in 
an n-inventor network. For example, in a co-authorship network with 10 inventors observed in 
the past three years, inventor 𝑖′s normalized degree of centrality equals 𝑛 9 in which 9 is the 
maximum number of ties inventor 𝑖 can form in this network if he or she have coauthored with 
other inventors in the past three years. After computing all inventors’ normalized degree of 
centrality in each year, we define an inventor who is in the top 10% of normalized degree of 
centrality as a “key” inventor of the firm in that year. Then across our sample period, we 
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calculate the average number of “key” inventors per year for each firm and select those 
connected firms that are in the top 10% in terms of the average number of “key” inventors. Our 
final subsample of firms with high centrality consists of 424 firms and 166,897 inventors when 
using LnPatent and LnCitePat as the dependent variable, and 320 firms and 146,083 inventors 
when using Exploit and Explore as the dependent variable. 
We report the results of the AKM estimation in the subsample of firms with high 
centrality in Table 8. In each column, we report the contribution of inventor and firm fixed 
effects in explaining the variation in the subsample as well as the fraction of model R-squared 
explained by each set of variables in parentheses. We also report the ratio of the contribution of 
inventor fixed effects to that of firm fixed effects. Consistent with our main results, inventor 
fixed effects are more important than firm fixed effects in explaining innovation performance 
measured by patent counts and citations per patent, and about the same important in explaining 
innovation style. Specifically, in a comparison with our baseline results, the ratio of the 
contribution of inventor fixed effects to the contribution of firm fixed effects increases. For 
example, the ratio increases from 6.3 in the baseline regression to 8.1 in this subsample when 
using the patent counts as the dependent variable. The ratio increases from 1.44 to 1.5 when 
using Exploit as the dependent variable.  
 
5.2 Inventor mobility 
Team turnover is related to the retention of key human capital and affects firm 
performance (Cornelli, Simintzi, and Vig, 2016). We consider a subsample of firms with high 
mobility to investigate the relation between inventor turnover of a firm and innovation output 
produced by inventors in this firm. As discussed in the introduction, there are two competing 
arguments regarding the relative contribution of inventors in a firm with high mobility. On the 
one hand, high inventor turnover could imply that these firms’ inventors are replaceable and 
hence firms’ organizational capital should matter more. One the other hand, high inventor 
turnover could indicate that the firm imposes high standards and pursues talented inventors, 
which thereby induces larger inventor contribution to the firm’s innovation output.  
To examine these alternative arguments above, we construct a subsample of firms with 
high inventor mobility. We define the mobility of a firm as the ratio of total number of movers to 
the total number of inventors of the firm. We then pick those connected firms that are in the top 
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20% bracket in terms of their mobility scores to form our high mobility subsample.16  The 
subsample is comprised of 587 firms and 21,113 inventors when using patent counts and 
citations per patent as the dependent variable, and 443 firms and 17,156 inventors when using 
exploitative and explorative ratios as the dependent variable. 
Table 9 reports the results using the AKM method in the subsample of firms with high 
inventor mobility. In each column, we report the explanatory powers of inventor fixed effects 
and firm fixed effects as well as the fraction of model R-squared explained by each set of 
variables in parentheses.  
The results suggest that, inventor fixed effects are more important than firm fixed effects 
in explaining innovation performance and about the same in explaining innovation style. 
Specifically, in column 1, the ratio rises from 6.3 (in the baseline tests) to 9.3 in the regression 
with patent counts as the dependent variable; in column 2 in which patent citation is the 
dependent variable, this ratio increases rapidly from 8.6 (in the baseline tests) to 20.5. In the 
regressions with innovation style metrics as the dependent variable, this ratio stays similar, from 
1.40 to 1.37 in column 3 and from 1.33 to 1.08 in column 4. All these results show that, in firms 
with high inventor mobility (i.e., high frequency in inventor turnovers), the relative contribution 
of inventor is more important in driving innovation performance, which supports our second 
arguments.  
 
5.3 Innovation difficulty 
The third dimension we consider when exploring heterogeneity is the subsample of firms 
in which innovation is more difficult to achieve. Because human capital tends to be more 
important in these firms, we postulate that inventors’ human capital plays a more significant role 
in determining innovation output than firms’ organizational capital.  
Following Tian and Wang (2014), we classify patents in our sample into four categories: 
(1) drugs, medical instrumentation, and chemicals (hereafter drugs); (2) computers, 
communications, and electrical (hereafter computers/electrical); (3) software programming and 
internet applications (hereafter software); (4) other miscellaneous patents. Based on the category 
of patents a firm produces most, we sort all our sample firms into one of four categories above. If 
                                                
16 Here we do not restrict our sample to the top 10% as before, because all these top 20% firms receive the same 
scores regarding mobility. 
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a firm has no patent, then we classify it into one of these four categories based on the type of 
patents that are most frequently produced by the firm’s SIC industry. Our subsample of high-tech 
firms consists of all firms in drugs and computers/electrical and inventors who work for these 
firms. The sample includes 2,549 firms and 145,666 inventors in the regressions using patent 
counts and citations as the dependent variable, and 1,996 firms and 132,145 inventors in the 
regressions using Exploit and Explore as the dependent variable. 
Table 10 presents the results that use the AKM method to estimate both inventor fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects. In each column, we report the contributions of inventor and firm 
fixed effects in explaining the variation in the subsample and the fraction of model R-squared 
explained by each set of variables in parentheses. We also compute the ratio that captures the 
relative contribution of inventors and firms.  
Compared with our baseline results, these ratios in the high-tech subsample are larger: in 
column 1 the relative importance ratio increases from 6.3 to 7.7; in column 2 this ratio raises 
from 8.6 to 11; in column 3 the ratio increases from 1.4 to 1.6 and column 4 reports that the ratio 
increases from 1.3 to 1.6. These results suggest that in high-tech industries inventors’ human 
capital is more crucial in driving innovation output than in an average industry. Table 10 also 
reports that the results of F-tests for joint significance of both inventor fixed effects and firm 
fixed effects as well as the respective significance of each fixed effect. We are able to reject the 
null hypothesis that inventor fixed effects and firm fixed effects do not jointly explain innovation 
output.  
 
6. Addressing inventors’ endogenous moving 
Because we rely on inventors’ moving across firms to estimate the relative importance of 
firms’ organizational capital and inventors’ human capital, an important concern is that our 
results could be biased due to endogenous moving by inventors. For example, if an inventor 
moves because she expects changes in her innovation output, we could wrongly attribute the 
change in innovation output to the firm’s organizational capital. Alternatively, if an inventor 
moves to a firm with similar performance, we could underestimate the contribution of firms’ 
organizational capital to her innovation output. We perform five sets of tests to address this 
endogenous moving concern.  
First, we compare the characteristics of firms to and from which inventors move. We also 
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compare the characteristics of movers and stayers. These tests help gauge how serious the issue 
of inventors’ endogenous moving is.  
Panel A of Table 11 compares the characteristics of firms that inventors move to and 
move from. We find that firms that inventors leave are on average larger, older, with better 
operating performance as well as higher leverage. The results suggest that on average movers 
end up in a firm that appears to be smaller, younger and less profitable than their previous firms. 
To the extent that individuals seek better career opportunities in better firms when they 
voluntarily move, this finding suggests that inventor moving in our sample is more likely due to 
involuntary moving (e.g., being laid off or demoted). Panel B compares the characteristics of 
movers and stayers. Movers generally produce fewer patents than stayers, and movers’ patents 
receive fewer citations than stayers. The results suggest that an average mover has worse 
innovation performance than a stayer. This finding again suggests that movers are unlikely to 
leave the current firm voluntarily and hence our setting is unlikely to be subject to endogenous 
inventor moving.    
 Second, assuming endogenous moving exists, we divide inventors into two groups. The 
first group includes inventors who “move up” in the sense that the firms they are joining have 
better past operating performance (i.e., ROA) than the ones they are leaving. The second group 
includes inventors who “move down”, i.e., these inventors are joining firms that have worse past 
operating performance (i.e., ROA) than the ones they are leaving. We assume that an inventor 
who “moves up” is more likely to move voluntarily and who “moves down” is more likely to 
move involuntarily (and thus this type of moving is more exogenous). Therefore, we could 
overestimate firm fixed effects and hence underestimate the relative importance of inventors’ 
human capital for “moving-up” inventors who are more subject to endogenous moving.17 
 In Table 12 Panels A and B, we report the results for “moving-down” and “moving-up” 
inventors, respectively. In Panel A we observe that the inventor is about 13 times as important as 
the firm in explaining patent counts in the group of inventors who move down. This finding 
helps alleviate endogenous moving concerns because it is unlikely that an inventor endogenously 
chooses to move down. In Panel B we see that the inventor is only 5 times as important as the 
                                                
17 When we divide the sample by inventor moves, we restrict the observations to the sample of movers who only 
move once (This is the sample we use for Table 10). This is because if the movers move multiple times, it is difficult 
to divide the sample according to their moving types (i.e., moving up vs. moving down, moving to similar firms vs. 
moving to different firms).  
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firm in explaining patent counts in the group of inventors who move up. The relative importance 
of the inventor to the firm in explaining citations is also smaller for the group of inventors who 
move up. Regarding innovation style, we do not observe a significant change in the relative 
importance of inventors’ human capital and firms’ organizational capital across the two groups 
of inventors. This observation indicates that inventors’ moving decisions do not seem to be 
related to their own innovation style. Overall, the results suggest that while it seems that there is 
some overestimation of firm fixed effects for inventors who move up, endogenous moving by 
inventors does not appear to substantially alter our overall conclusion. 
Third, another concern of our main results is that inventors could endogenously choose to 
move to firms with similar operating performance. In this case, we may underestimate firms’ 
organizational capital and hence overestimate the relative importance of inventors’ human 
capital. This is because we would attribute little innovation to firm fixed effects if inventors only 
move to firms with similar performance, given that it is less likely for us to observe a change in 
the inventors’ patenting around the moves. However, firms could have contributed more to 
innovation had the inventors moved to the firms with different performance. To address this 
concern, in Panels C and D of Table 12, we divide the sample into two groups. The first group 
contains inventors who move to firms with similar performance. We define a similarly 
performing firm as those that are in the bottom quartile of the difference in ROA between the 
current firm and the previous firm. The other group contains inventors who move to firms with 
different performance, which is defined as the firms that are in the top quartile of the difference 
in ROA between the current firm and the previous firm.  
The results reported in Panels C and D show that the inventor is 8.2 times as important as 
the firm in explaining patent counts when she moves between firms with similar performance, 
and the inventor is 7 times as important as the firm in explaining patent counts when she moves 
between firms with different performance. For citations per patent, exploratory score, and 
exploitative score, the inventor is also more important than the firm in terms of the explanatory 
power. The evidence once again suggests that endogenous moving could not completely account 
for our main results.  
 Fourth, even if inventors move to firms that appear very different in terms of operating 
performance, it is possible that these firms are operationally similar, which still causes the firm 
fixed effect to be underestimated. For example, if the firm to which an inventor is moving is in 
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an industry different from her previous firm, the new firm is more likely to affect her patenting 
by providing vastly different access to resource and environment. In contrast, if the firm to which 
an inventor is moving is in the same industry as her previous firm, the new firm is less likely to 
affect her patenting. Hence, we are likely to underestimate firm fixed effects in the former 
situation than that in the latter case. To address this concern, we classify inventor moving into 
two groups. One group contains inventors who move within the same industry and the other 
group contains inventors who move across industries. Panels E and Panel F of Table 12 repeat 
the main tests that compare inventors who move within the same industry and move across 
industries, respectively. We find that inventor fixed effects are 6.1 times as important as firm 
fixed effects in explaining patent counts when inventors move across different industries, and are 
12.9 times as important as firm fixed effects in explaining patent counts when inventors move 
within the same industry. In addition, in terms of citations per patent, exploitative score, and 
exploratory score, the inventor also appears to be much more important than the firm. As a 
matter of fact, the ratio of explanatory power of inventor fixed effects and firm fixed effects for 
inventors who move across different industries is very close to our baseline findings. Thus, the 
results suggest that inventors who move within the same industry and hence are mostly likely to 
be subject to endogenous moving have limited effects on our results.  
 Finally, if an inventor moves to a firm for which there is a better match between the firm 
and herself, then part of the change in her innovation output would come from the matching 
effect, rather than the firm-specific fixed effects in innovation. However, under the AKM method, 
we would attribute the change in innovation output to firm-specific fixed effects. In other words, 
this matching possibility may lead to an overestimation of firm fixed effects. We address the 
concern in two ways. First, we control for the previous firm and inventor performance in our 
regression, under the assumption that part of the matching effect would be reflected in firm and 
inventor quality. Second, we examine a subsample of movers who are less likely to be subject to 
the matching effect. Panel G of Table 12 considers inventors who have moved between firms 
with a change of patent output within 25% in 3 years.18 While the maximum change is 25%, the 
mean change in the patent output is only 0.5 %, and the median change is 0%. Given such a 
small change in patent output, the matching issue bears very little effect in this subsample. The 
results are consistent with our main finding that inventors play a more important role than the 
                                                
18 The results are similar when we use 20% or 10% and when we use 1 year or 5 years.  
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firm in explaining innovation performance, and about the same role in explaining innovation 
style. As a matter of fact, the relative importance of inventors against the firm is even higher in 
this subsample that is supposedly subject to less matching problem, which indicates an 
overestimation of firm fixed effects caused by the matching problem.  
Overall, the test results in this section suggest that our main findings that individual 
human capital plays a way more important role than firms’ organizational capital in explaining 
innovation performance is not completely driven by inventors’ endogenous moving decisions. 
We would also like to note that the matching issue is not specific to our method. It is present in 
any data that matches labor with capital. Finally, we acknowledge that one needs to be cautious 
in interpreting and generalizing our results because endogenous moving by inventors appears to 
play some role in our findings and we cannot completely rule it out.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper, we study persistence in inventor and firm innovation output, and investigate 
the role of inventor human capital in a firm’s innovation output. We show innovation persistence 
at both the firm level and the inventor level. Furthermore, that time-invariant inventor fixed 
effects explain a majority of the heterogeneity in innovation performance in terms of patent 
counts and citations, while inventor fixed effects play a relatively less important role in 
explaining innovation style in terms of patent exploratory and exploitive scores. In the cross 
section, inventors contribute more to innovation output when they are better connected, are in 
firms with higher inventor mobility, and are in firms in which innovation is more difficult to 
achieve.  
Our findings have important policy implications. Our results imply that human capital 
plays a crucial role in terms of generating high quality innovation for a firm, while firm 
organizational capital (such as corporate culture) affects the style of innovation output to a larger 
degree. Therefore, to build long-lasting growth, a firm should allocate more resources on 
attracting, training, and retaining talents. A firm also needs to be cautious with the culture it 
fosters and how it is going to affect the type of innovation generated by its employees.   
Finally, we need to bear in mind three caveats when generalizing our results. First, 
similar to other studies that use movements of individuals (e.g., executives, venture capitalists, 
bankers, employees, etc.) as an identification strategy, our empirical setting is subject to the 
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concern that inventors’ moving could be endogenous. Our results intend to show the average 
effect of moving across firms on inventors who actually move. We are silent about the reason for 
inventors’ moving, although additional tests suggest that endogenous moving does not alter our 
conclusion. Second, we are only able to capture the contribution to innovation output from 
movers and stayers in firms with at least one mover. If there is no inventor moving in a firm, we 
would not be able to separate the contribution from the inventor and the firm. Finally, because 
innovation is human capital intensive, we are likely to attribute more innovation contribution to 
inventors. Hence, what we find is likely a lower bound of a firm’s organization capital 
contribution to its long-term success. 
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Appendix A 
Details in sample construction 
We match the HBS patent and inventor database with the NBER patent citation database 
following four steps:  
(1) We break all patents in the NBER database into two subsets based on the number of 
assignees each patent has---one subset (hereafter called subset A) contains all patents owned by a 
single assignee while the other one (called subset B) includes patents owned by multiple 
assignees.  For inventors whose patents belong to subset A, their company affiliations can be 
unambiguously identified. We match all patents in subset A with the HBS database using patent 
number, resulting in a set of 6,270,074 matched inventor-patent observations denoted by set A.  
(2) We divide subset B, consisting of all unmatched observations after step one into two 
groups: one group referred to as subset B1 that is comprised of inventor-patent observations in 
which each patent is filed by a single inventor; and the other group referred to as subset B2 that 
collects the remaining inventor-patent observations in which every patent is coauthored by 
multiple inventors. We then match all observations in subset B1 with set B by patent number, 
which leads to 22,555 inventor-patent-assignee observations corresponding to 11,461 inventor-
patent observations in subset B1 as each patent may be possessed by several assignees. We then 
determine one assignee for each observation based on matched information in subset A, i.e., we 
designate a unique assignee to an inventor in the year that patent granted if this assignee 
coincides with one assignee for which the inventor has been recognized to work in subset A in 
the same year. If we dig out multiple assignees through above method, we exploit the location 
information to pin down the assignee for these instances. Another extreme case is that we find no 
appropriate assignees in subset A using the above method, we also exploit the location 
information to help us determine the assignee for these instances. For example, if the inventor’s 
location is Mahwah of New Jersey, the assignee with perfectly matched location would be 
assigned. If several assignees have the same location, we randomly choose one. Otherwise, we 
relax our searching criteria and select the assignee sharing the same state, New Jersey and so on 
so forth. In such way, we can pin down all assignees for the 11,461 observations.  
(3) For all observations in subset B2, they are patents filed by multiple inventors and 
belonged to various assignees. Using patent number, we join them with subset B to form all 
pairwise combinations and then select one assignee for each inventor-patent observation. The 
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selection procedure is identical to that in step 2. As a result, assignees for the 250,168 inventor-
patent instances in Counterpart B2 can be identified.  
(4) Combing all observations obtained in above three steps, our final matched sample 
consists of 6,531,703 inventor-patent observations whose assignee can be uniquely identified. 
Then we nail down the company affiliation for each inventor over his/her whole career with the 
assistance of 6,531,703 matched inventor-patent observations. If all patents filed by an inventor 
of a year belong to a single assignee, we assume that the inventor was hired by this particular 
assignee during patent filing years. Another situation often encountered is that patents filed by an 
inventor of one year are owned by different assignees. For instance, two patents of an inventor 
are claimed by assignee A while another five patents belong to assignee B in a year. In such a 
case, it’s quite reasonable to assume that the inventor was employed by the assignee to which 
most patents of the inventor belong in that year. Particularly, when an inventor files the same 
number of patents for both assignee A and B in certain year, we utilize the inventor’s 
employment information of last year to help us identify — if he worked for assignee A (B) last 
year, we presume that he was employed by A (B) this year in order to make his career path 
consistent.19 Otherwise, we randomly pick one for him. This procedure leads about 4,251,546 
inventor-year observations.  
For our analysis, we augment our inventor-year sample in a time order by filling all year 
gaps for inventors who appear in the patent database but do not have patents in the gap years. For 
example, an inventor filed patents in 1986 and 1991. Thus our sample only captures the 
inventor’s performances in 1986 and 1991. We expand the observations between 1986 and 1991 
for him or her by assigning zero to patent counts and citations per patent.20 This method comes 
with a caveat: that how we can accurately identify inventors’ employer in gap years. Following 
the example above, it would be quite intuitive and easy for us to decide which company the 
inventor belongs to between 1986 and 1991 if the patents he filed in both years are owned by the 
same company. It would turn to be difficult if the patents filed in 1986 and 1991 belong to 
distinct companies, say, A and B. In other words, how do we decide the company affiliations of a 
                                                
19 Admittedly, this is an ad hoc assignment. To alleviate this concern, we repeat our analysis with different assigning 
methods. For example, we use the inventor’s employment information in subsequent year, i.e., if the inventor 
worked for assignee A (B) in next year, we assume his employer of this year was A (B). We also tried the method to 
pick an assignee for the inventor randomly. These alternative methods do not alter the nature of the results.  
20 We assign missing value to metrics that measures inventors’ innovation style (exploratory ratio and exploitative 
ratio) in years with no patent filing. 
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mover for the transition years where we have no observations on his patent filing? We adopt the 
method by assuming that the inventor belongs to the old company A in the first half of his 
transition years (1987 to 1988) and belongs to the new company B in the second half of the 
transition years (1989 to 1990).21 This procedure leads to 7,445,855 inventor-year observations 
in our augmented sample. 
 
  
                                                
21 We try other methods of assigning company affiliations to a mover: (1) assuming the inventor belongs to the old 
company A for all the transition years; (2) assuming the inventor belongs to the new company B for all the transition 
years. Also, we conduct our analysis in which we exclude all years with missing observations on patent filing. The 
results are qualitatively similar across these implementations. 
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Appendix B 
Definition of variables       
Variable Definition 
Measures of innovation 
LnPatentt+3 Natural logarithm of one plus inventor i’s total number of patents filed (and 
eventually granted) in year t+3;  
LnCitePatt+3 Natural logarithm of one plus inventor i’s total number of citations received 
on the inventor’s patents filed (and eventually granted), scaled by the 
number of the patents filed (and eventually granted)  in year t+3;  
Exploitt+3 The number of exploitative patents filed (and eventually granted) divided by 
the number of all patents filed (and eventually granted) by the inventor in 
year t+3; a patent is classified as exploitative if at least 60% of its citations 
are based on existing knowledge; 
Exploret+3 The number of exploratory patents filed (and eventually granted) divided by 
the number of all patents filed (and eventually granted) by the firm in year 
t+3; a patent is classified as exploratory if at least 60% of its citations are 
based on new knowledge; 
Measures of control variables  
LnExpnumt Natural logarithm of one plus inventor i’s average number of patents filed 
(and eventually granted) per year in the three years prior to year t; 
LnExpcitt Natural logarithm of one plus inventor i’s average number of scaled 
citations received on the inventor’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in 
three years prior to year t; 
Assetst Book value of total assets (#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t; 
R&DAssetst Research and development expenditures (#46) divided by book value of 
total assets (#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t, set to 0 if missing; 
Aget Firm i's age, approximated by the number of years the firm has been listed 
on Compustat; 
ROAt Return-on-assets ratio defined as operating income before depreciation 
(#13) divided by book value of total assets (#6), measured at the end of 
fiscal year t; 
PPEAssetst Property, Plant & Equipment (net, #8) divided by book value of total assets 
(#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t; 
Leveraget Firm i’s leverage ratio, defined as book value of debt (#9 + #34) divided by 
book value of total assets (#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t; 
CapexAssetst Capital expenditure (#128) scaled by book value of total assets (#6) 
measured at the end of fiscal year t; 
TobinQt Firm i's market-to-book ratio during fiscal year t, calculated as [market 
value of equity (#199 × #25) plus book value of assets (#6) minus book 
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value of equity (#60) minus balance sheet deferred taxes (#74, set to 0 if 
missing)] divided by book value of assets (#6); 
KZindext Firm i's KZ index measured at the end of fiscal year t, calculated as -1.002 × 
Cash Flow ((#18+#14)/#8) plus 0.283 × Q ((#6+#199×#25-#60-#74)/#6) 
plus 3.189  × Leverage ((#9+#34)/(#9+#34+#216)) minus 39.368 × 
Dividends ((#21+#19)/#8) minus 1.315 × Cash holdings(#1/#8), where #8 is 
lagged; 
Hindext Herfindahl index of 4-digit SIC industry j where firm i belongs, measured at 
the end of fiscal year t. 
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Panel A                                                                Panel B 
 
 
Panel C                                                               Panel D 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects: connectedness sample. This figure 
displays the distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects from the AKM regression in the 
connectedness sample with four different dependent variables: the log of one plus the adjusted 
number of patents (Panel A), the log of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent 
(Panel B), the Exploit index (Panel C), and Explore (Panel D). In the graph, the estimates are 
normalized so the mean value of the inventor fixed effects is zero.  
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Panel A                                                                Panel B 
 
 
Panel C                                                               Panel D 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects: largest group of the connected sample. 
This figure displays the distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects from the AKM regression 
in the largest connected sample with four different dependent variables: the log of one plus the 
adjusted number of patents (Panel A), the log of one plus the adjusted number of citations per 
patent (Panel B), the Exploit index (Panel C), and Explore (Panel D). In the graph, the estimates 
are normalized so the mean value of the inventor fixed effects is zero.  
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Table 1: Inventor mobility characteristics—full sample  
This table reports the mobility structure of our full sample from 1970 to 2003. A mover is 
defined as the inventor who switches employers. Panel A presents the employment information 
of inventors in our sample. Panel B presents the distribution of movers across firms. 
 
Panel A: Number of movers out of all inventors 
 
Mover No. of firms in which 
inventors are employed 
No. of inventors Percentage 
No 1 172,117 84.09 
 Subtotal 172,117 84.09 
 
 
Yes 
2 28,159 13.76 
3 3,776 1.84 
4 552 0.27 
5 65 0.03 
6 7 0 
7 2 0 
 Subtotal 32,561 15.91 
 Total 204,678 100 
 
 
Panel B: Number of movers per firm 
 
Mover Per Firm Frequency Percentage Cum. 
0 1,412 24.68 24.68 
1-5 1,719 30.04 54.72 
6-10 734 12.83 67.55 
11-20 610 10.66 78.21 
21-30 274 4.79 83 
31-50 268 4.68 87.68 
51-100 253 4.42 92.10 
>100 452 7.90 100 
Total 5,722 100  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the full sample and the connectedness sample in 
inventor and firm level when using patent counts and citations per patent as dependent variables 
in our baseline regression. Panel A presents the summary statistics of patent counts and citations 
per patent as well as the time-varying inventor characteristics measures for inventor-year 
observations. Panel B presents the summary statistics of the time-varying firm characteristics 
measures for firm-year observations. Definitions of variables are listed in the table of our 
appendix. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for inventors 
 
Variable Mean Median SD 25th  75th  N (inventor-year) 
Patent       
Full Sample 0.910 0  1.484 0 1 1,246,951 
Connectedness Sample 0.912 0 1.486 0 1 1,236,561 
CitePat        
Full Sample 6.463 0 13.077 0 7.457 1,246,951 
Connectedness Sample 6.476 0 13.091 0 7.481 1,236,561 
Exploit       
Full Sample 0.126 0 0.307 0 0 555,592 
Connectedness Sample 0.127 0 0.307 0 0 548,233 
Explore       
Full Sample 0.745 1 0.401 0.5 1 555,592 
Connectedness Sample 0.745 1 0.401 0.5 1 548,233 
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Panel B: Summary statistics for firms 
Variable Mean Median SD 25th  75th  N (firm-year) 
Assets (million)       
Full Sample 7,120.888 691.71 21,416.62 110.87 4,084.982 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 7,569.452 844.164 22,253.39 137.228 4,512 40,047 
RDAssets       
Full Sample 0.059 0.032 0.143 0.010 0.068 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.060 0.035 0.140 0.012 0.069 40,047 
Age       
Full Sample 21.932 21  13.151 10.000 32.000 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 22.386 22 13.305 11.000 33.000 40,047 
ROA       
Full Sample 0.115 0.143 0.268 0.090 0.195 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.121 0.145 0.254 0.093 0.197 40,047 
PPEAssets       
Full Sample 0.298 0.269 0.161 0.189 0.377 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.299 0.271 0.158 0.193 0.377 40,047 
Leverage       
Full Sample 0.222 0.209 0.176 0.101 0.309 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.220 0.208 0.173 0.103 0.304 40,047 
CapexAssets       
Full Sample 0.068 0.059 0.047 0.038 0.085 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.069 0.060 0.046 0.039 0.086 40,047 
TobinQ       
Full Sample 1.940 1.317 2.635 1.021 1.967 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 1.942 1.339 2.463 1.034 2.005 40,047 
KZindex       
Full Sample -5.429 -1.656 88.358 -4.482 -0.065 46,177 
Connectedness Sample -4.997 -1.714 52.882 -4.518 -0.129 40,047 
Hindex       
Full Sample 0.263 0.213 0.187 0.128 0.345 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.264 0.214 0.187 0.127 0.348 40,047 
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Table 3: Performance persistence measured by rankings 
In this table, Panel A reports regressions where dependent variable is the dummy whether the 
performance of the inventor in terms of filed patent counts is in the top quantile (25%) every 
year (=1) or not (=0) and the independent variable is Top_t that the same dummy t years ago. 
Panel B reports the same regressions results as Panel A by using the dummy whether the 
performance of the inventor in terms of citations per patent is in the top quartile (25%) every 
year and the independent variable being the corresponding dummy t years ago. Panel C reports 
regressions where dependent variable is the dummy whether the performance of the firm in terms 
of filed patent number is in the top quantile (25%) every year (=1) or not (=0) and the 
independent variable is Top_t that the same dummy t years ago. Panel D reports the same 
regressions results as Panel C by using the dummy whether the performance of the firm in terms 
of citations per patent is in the top quartile (25%) every year and the independent variable being 
the corresponding dummy t years ago. Our specifications are linear models. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Inventor performance persistence (patent counts) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Top_1 0.131*** 
(0.001) 
  0.122*** 
(0.001) 
 0.116*** 
(0.001) 
Top_2  0.085*** 
(0.001) 
 0.069*** 
(0.001) 
0.080*** 
(0.001) 
0.067*** 
(0.001) 
Top_3   0.029*** 
(0.001) 
 0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
Constant -0.003 
(0.012) 
0.059*** 
(0.013) 
0.097*** 
(0.013) 
0.060*** 
(0.013) 
0.097*** 
(0.013) 
0.090*** 
(0.013) 
Adj. R2 0.110 0.079 0.032 0.153 0.095 0.161 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,325,882 2,203,695 2,081,508 2,203,695 2,081,508 2,081,508 
 
 
Panel B: Inventor performance persistence (citations per patent) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Top_1 0.077*** 
(0.001) 
  0.078*** 
(0.001) 
 0.074*** 
(0.001) 
Top_2  0.050*** 
(0.001) 
 0.044*** 
(0.001) 
0.051*** 
(0.001) 
0.045*** 
(0.001) 
Top_3   0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
Constant 0.015 
(0.016) 
0.038** 
(0.016) 
0.056*** 
(0.016) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
0.055*** 
(0.016) 
0.050*** 
(0.016) 
Adj. R2 0.051 0.035 0.005 0.083 0.041 0.087 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,325,882 2,203,695 2,081,508 2,203,695 2,081,508 2,081,508 
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Panel C: Firm performance persistence (patent counts) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Top_1 0.403*** 
(0.006) 
  0.339*** 
(0.007) 
 0.322*** 
(0.007) 
Top_2  0.262*** 
(0.006) 
 0.131*** 
(0.007) 
0.239*** 
(0.007) 
0.137*** 
(0.007) 
Top_3   0.147*** 
(0.007) 
 0.056*** 
(0.007) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
Constant -0.442*** 
(0.036) 
-0.441*** 
(0.041) 
-0.408*** 
(0.047) 
-0.265*** 
(0.039) 
-0.265*** 
(0.046) 
-0.154*** 
(0.044) 
Adj. R2 0.620 0.500 0.407 0.658 0.532 0.663 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,333 25,260 23,002 25,260 23,002 23,002 
 
 
Panel D: Firm performance persistence (citations per patent) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Top_1 0.072*** 
(0.006) 
  0.066*** 
(0.007) 
 0.057*** 
(0.007) 
Top_2  0.043*** 
(0.007) 
 0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.031*** 
(0.007) 
Top_3   0.023*** 
(0.007) 
 0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.019*** 
(0.007) 
Constant 0.738*** 
(0.057) 
0.710*** 
(0.061) 
0.733*** 
(0.067) 
0.660*** 
(0.061) 
0.706*** 
(0.067) 
0.668*** 
(0.067) 
Adj. R2 0.068 0.047 0.034 0.081 0.047 0.074 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,333 25,260 23,002 25,260 23,002 23,002 
 
  
47 
 
Table 4: Persistence by number versus previous numbers 
In this table, Panel A reports regressions where dependent variable is the number of filed patents 
for inventors at current year and the independent variable is NPat_t that measures the average 
number of filed patents in previous t years of the inventor. Panel B reports the same regressions 
results as Panel A by using the direct count of an inventor’s citations per patent each year instead 
and the independent variable being the corresponding average counting in previous t years. Panel 
C reports regressions where dependent variable is the number of filed patents for firms at current 
year and the independent variable is NPat_t that measures the average number of filed patents in 
previous t year of the firm. Panel D reports the same regressions results as Panel C by using the 
direct count of citations per patent for a firm instead and the independent variable being the 
corresponding average counts in previous t years. All specifications are linear. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: inventor sample with patent counts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NPat_1 0.425*** 
(0.001) 
   
NPat_2  0.566*** 
(0.001) 
  
NPat_3   0.644*** 
(0.002) 
 
NPat_4    0.685*** 
(0.003) 
Constant 1.102*** 
(0.061) 
0.954*** 
(0.055) 
1.009*** 
(0.050) 
0.885*** 
(0.050) 
Adj. R2 0.112 0.284 0.375 0.419 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inventor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,163,050 734,823 520,405 391,544 
 
Panel B: inventor sample with citations per patent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NPat_1 0.126*** 
(0.001) 
   
NPat_2  0.202*** 
(0.002) 
  
NPat_3   0.243*** 
(0.002) 
 
NPat_4    0.270*** 
(0.003) 
Constant 1.711*** 
(0.624) 
2.224*** 
(0.527) 
2.766*** 
(0.475) 
2.412*** 
(0.439) 
Adj. R2 0.045 0.091 0.110 0.105 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inventor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,162,822 734,672 520,212 391,874 
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Panel C: firm sample with patent counts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NPat_1 0.948*** 
(0.003) 
   
NPat_2  0.941*** 
(0.005) 
  
NPat_3   1.031*** 
(0.008) 
 
NPat_4    0.995*** 
(0.011) 
Constant -39.656*** 
(8.286) 
-52.371*** 
(13.598) 
-35.562* 
(21.132) 
52.391 
(36.606) 
Adj. R2 0.949 0.934 0.927 0.909 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,392 8,790 5,894 4,159 
 
 
Panel D: firm sample with citations per patent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NPat_1 0.269*** 
(0.008) 
   
NPat_2  0.345*** 
(0.014) 
  
NPat_3   0.402*** 
(0.020) 
 
NPat_4    0.317*** 
(0.031) 
Constant 22.934*** 
(2.817) 
17.069*** 
(3.536) 
26.001*** 
(4.307) 
25.692*** 
(6.623) 
Adj. R2 0.284 0.320 0.279 0.265 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,392 8,790 5,894 4,159 
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Table 5: Inventor and firm fixed effects—Connectedness sample regressions 
This table reports three-way fixed effects regressions using the method in Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis (1999) and Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) to estimate both inventor and firm 
fixed effects in the connectedness sample. The estimation is implemented by using the Stata 
command “felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen (2008). Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of 
one plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural 
logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent as the dependent variable (zero 
if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit and Explore scores 
as the dependent variables, respectively (missing value is assigned if no patents filed by an 
inventor of a year). Contribution of inventor fixed effects RCD	(E,			GHDIH%CJ	KL)SMJ	(E)  captures the 
explanatory power of inventor fixed effects for innovation output (similarly for VC fixed effects). 
The percentages in parentheses present the fraction of model R-squared explained by each set of 
variables (see Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012), Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) for details). “Inv. 
FE / Firm FE” captures the ratio of the contribution of inventor fixed effects to the contribution 
of firm fixed effects in explaining innovation output. The rows for “F-test on Fixed Effects” 
report the F-statistics for the joint significance of both fixed effects and respective significance of 
inventor and firm fixed effects. Definitions of variables are defined in Appendix B. “# Firms” is 
the total number of firms in our sample. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.284 (53.08%) 0.266 (62.15%) 0.333 (55.50%) 0.318 (49.84%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.045 (8.41%) 0.031 (7.24%) 0.231 (38.50%) 0.240 (37.62%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 6.311 8.581 1.442 1.325 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.94*** 1.87*** 2.34*** 2.58*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.75*** 1.67*** 1.28*** 1.34*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.91*** 2.92*** 3.79*** 5.16*** 
 
Adj. R-squared after the Addition of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects 
Control Variables 0.354 0.213 0.117 0.156 
Adding Firm FE 0.373 0.237 0.337 0.387 
Adding Inventor FE 0.438 0.308 0.379 0.431 
Adding Both FE 0.442 0.313 0.393 0.450 
     
# Movers 32,420 32,420 21,133 21,133 
# Stayers 168,663 168,663 161,894 161,894 
# Firms 4,294 4,294 3,249 3,249 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,231,352 1,231,352 547,923 547,923 
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Table 6: Different samples 
This table reports regression results using the MDV method in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) to 
estimate both inventor and firm fixed effects of the mobility sample in Panel A and 
regression results using the AKM method to estimate both inventor and firm fixed effects of 
the largest group of connected sample in Panel B. Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of one 
plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural 
logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent as the dependent variable 
(zero if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit and 
Explore scores as the dependent variables respectively (missing value is assigned if no 
patents filed by an inventor of a year). Contribution of inventor fixed effects 	RCD	(E,			GHDIH%CJ	KL)SMJ	(E)  captures the explanatory power of inventor fixed effects in explaining 
innovation output (similarly for VC fixed effects). The percentages in parentheses present the 
fraction of model R-squared explained by each set of variables (see Graham, Li, and Qiu 
(2012), Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) for details). “Inv. FE / Firm FE” captures the ratio 
of the contribution of inventor fixed effects to the contribution of firm fixed effects in 
explaining innovation output. The rows for “F-test on Fixed Effects” report the F-statistics for 
the joint significance of both fixed effects and respective significance of inventor and firm 
fixed effects. Definitions of variables are defined in Appendix B. “# Firms” is the total 
number of firms in our sample. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Inventor and firm fixed effects based on the mobility sample 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-squared Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.237 (49.17%) 0.206 (57.87%) 0.187 (40.22%) 0.171 (33.60%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.050 (10.37%) 0.042 (11.80%) 0.255 (54.84%) 0.243 (47.74%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 4.740 4.905 0.733 0.734 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 2.15*** 1.96*** 2.70*** 2.81*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.96*** 1.72*** 1.22*** 1.27*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.15*** 2.18*** 4.90*** 5.38*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.414 0.272 0.315 0.371 
# Persons (#Movers) 32,420 32,420 21,133 21,133 
# Firms 4,294 4,294 3,249 3,249 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 320,983 320,983 113,025 113,025 
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Panel B: Inventor and firm fixed effects based on the largest group 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.284 (53.08%) 0.266 (62.15%) 0.333 (55.50%) 0.318 (49.92%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.045 (8.41%) 0.031 (7.24%) 0.231 (38.50%) 0.240 (37.68%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 6.311 8.581 1.442 1.325 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.94*** 1.87*** 2.34*** 2.58*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.75*** 1.68*** 1.28*** 1.34*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.97*** 2.97*** 3.88*** 5.22*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.442 0.313 0.394 0.451 
# Movers 32,310 32,310 20,991 20,991 
# Stayers 168,328 168,328 161,346 161,346 
# Firms 4,113 4,113 3,055 3,055 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,229,376 1,229,376 546,519 546,519 
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Table 7: Distribution of retrieved inventor fixed effects 
This table tabulates distributions of retrieved inventor fixed effects from the AKM 
regressions using four different dependent variables in both the connectedness sample (Panel 
A) and the largest group of connected sample (Panel B). The estimates are normalized so that 
the mean value of the inventor fixed effects is zero. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of inventor fixed effects in the connectedness sample 
 
Dep. Variable Median SD 25th  75th  Number of Inventors 
LnPatent -0.062 0.306 -0.196 0.137 201,083 
LnCitePat -0.112 0.727 -0.504 0.407 201,083 
Exploit -0.029 0.174 -0.084 0.035 183,027 
Explore 0.037 0.223 -0.100 0.126 183,027 
 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of inventor fixed effects in the largest group 
 
Dep. Variable Median SD 25th  75th  Number of Inventors 
      
LnPatent -0.062 0.306 -0.196 0.137 200,638 
LnCitePat -0.112 0.727 -0.503 0.407 200,638 
Exploit -0.029 0.174 -0.084 0.035 182,337 
Explore 0.037 0.222 -0.100 0.125 182,337 
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Table 8: Subsample of firms with high centrality 
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both 
inventor and firm fixed effects in a subsample of firms with high centrality. We define the 
centrality of firm based on their employers’ degree of centrality. From 1970 to 2003, we 
calculate inventors’ normalized degree centrality of a year, which equals the number of 
coauthor relationships of past three years an inventor has in the network divided by the 
maximum possible coauthor relationships of past three years he or she could have in an n-
inventor network (see Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) for more details on the 
methodology). In each year, we define an inventor who is in the top 10% of normalized 
degree centrality as a “key” inventor of the firm. Then across our sample period, we compute 
the average number of “key” inventors per year for all firms and select those connected firms 
that are in the top 10% in terms of the average number of “key” inventors, which comprise a 
subsample of firms with high centrality. The estimation is implemented by using the Stata 
command “felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen (2008). Column 1 uses the natural logarithm 
of one plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the 
natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of citations per patent as the dependent 
variable (zero if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit 
and Explore scores as the dependent variables (missing value is assigned if no patents filed 
by an inventor of a year). Definitions of variables are defined in the table of appendix. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.282 (50.90%) 0.260 (57.78%) 0.338 (56.52%) 0.319 (50.08%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.035 (6.32%) 0.020 (4.44%) 0.224 (37.46%) 0.239 (37.52%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 8.057 13.000 1.509 1.335 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.99*** 1.92*** 2.45*** 2.72*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.82*** 1.74*** 1.35*** 1.40*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 9.99*** 9.60*** 18.43*** 21.92*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.467 0.343 0.405 0.462 
# Movers 17,657 17,657 10,751 10,751 
# Stayers 149,132 149,132 135,109 135,109 
# Firms 426 426 309 309 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,027,973 1,027,973 451,666 451,666 
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Table 9: Subsample of firms with high mobility 
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both 
inventor and firm fixed effects in a subsample of firms with high mobility. The subsample of 
firms with high mobility includes only the set of connected firms in top 20% (actually these 
firms receive same scores regarding mobility) of mobility which equals the ratio of the total 
number of movers a firm has to the total number of inventors of that firm. The estimation is 
implemented by using the Stata command “felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen (2008). 
Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patents as the 
dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number 
of citations per patent as the dependent variable (zero if no patents filed by an inventor of a 
year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit and Explore indices as the dependent variables 
(missing value is assigned if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Definitions of 
variables are defined in the table of appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.307 (56.02%) 0.308 (69.84%) 0.318 (52.91%) 0.267 (41.40%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.033 (6.02%) 0.015 (3.40%) 0.232 (38.60%) 0.247 (38.29%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 9.303 20.533 1.371 1.081 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.72*** 1.60*** 1.44*** 1.50*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.54*** 1.43*** 0.87 1.05*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.86*** 2.02*** 4.64*** 5.16*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.419 0.281 0.275 0.355 
# Movers 3,018 3,018 2,167 2,167 
# Stayers 18,095 18,095 14,989 14,989 
# Firms 587 587 443 443 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 98,960 98,960 39,914 39,914 
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Table 10: Subsample of high-tech firms 
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both 
inventor and firm fixed effects in a subsample of high-tech firms. The subsample of high-tech 
firms considers only the set of firms in “Drug & Chemical” category that includes industries 
mainly producing patents on drugs, medical instrumentation, and chemicals or in “Computer 
& Electrical” category that includes industries mainly producing patents on computers, 
communications technologies, and electrical technologies (see Tian and Wang (2014) for 
details). The estimation is implemented by using the Stata command “felsdvreg” proposed by 
Cornelissen (2008). Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of 
patents as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the 
adjusted number of citations per patent as the dependent variable (zero if no patents filed by 
an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit and Explore indices as the dependent 
variables (missing value is assigned if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Definitions 
of variables are defined in the table of appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.292 (53.19%) 0.266 (59.38%) 0.350 (58.04%) 0.334 (52.85%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.038 (6.92%) 0.024 (5.36%) 0.216 (35.82%) 0.203 (32.12%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 7.684 11.038 1.620 1.645 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.97*** 1.90*** 2.43*** 2.53*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.77*** 1.70*** 1.26*** 1.34*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 3.17*** 3.21*** 3.94*** 4.55*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.456 0.334 0.404 0.447 
# Movers 19,767 19,767 13,555 13,555 
# Stayers 125,899 125,899 118,590 118,590 
# Firms 2,549 2,549 1,996 1,996 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 870,111 870,111 403,099 403,099 
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Table 11: Characteristics of firms and inventors 
This table reports characteristics of firms that movers leave and move to, inventors that move 
and stay, and firms in and out of the sample. A mover is an inventor that switches firms 
during the sample period. Numbers reported are the mean across each subsample. Column 3 
reports the differences in mean and their significance between the two samples. Panel A 
reports the differences in characteristics between firms which inventors move to and firms 
which inventors move from. Panel B reports the mean of innovation metrics for movers and 
stayers. “Moving From” is for firms that only have a mover that leaves the firm. “Moving To” 
is for firms that only have a mover that moves to the firm. Panel B reports the mean of 
innovation output of movers and stayers, and the difference in the mean of innovation output 
between movers and stayers. “Movers” are inventors that move at least once. “Stayers” are 
inventors that stay in the same company and never move. Definitions of variables are defined 
in the table of appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firms from and to which inventors move 
 Moving To Moving From Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Assets 24,222.86 27,195.5 -2,972.64*** 
RDAssets 0.064 0.057 0.007*** 
ROA 0.142 0.151 -0.009*** 
Leverage 0.215 0.231 -0.016*** 
PPEAssets 0.282 0.312 -0.030*** 
CapexAssets 0.070 0.077 -0.007*** 
TobinQ 2.058 1.663 0.385*** 
Founded Year 1971 1963 8.000*** 
Observations 3,615 2,384  
 
Panel B: Stayers vs. movers 
 Movers Stayers Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Patent 0.937 1.026 -0.089*** 
Citation 6.858 7.168 -0.310*** 
Exploit 0.072 0.114 -0.042*** 
Explore 0.812 0.757 0.055*** 
Observations 32,513 168,772  
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Table 12: Different types of movers  
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both 
inventor and firm fixed effects in subsamples containing different types of movers. The 
connected group is constructed after restricting to this set of movers. The subsample of 
movers that move down starts with movers whose new firm’s operating performance (defined 
as the average ROA of the firm in past three years) was higher than their previous firm’s 
operating performance. The subset of movers that move up starts with movers whose new 
firm’s operating performance was lower than their previous firm’s operating performance. 
The subsample of movers that move to firms with similar operating performance considers 
the movers who moved to a firm that was in the bottom quartile of the difference between 
new versus previous firm performance. The subsample of movers that move to firms with 
difference operating performance considers the movers who moved to a firm that was in the 
top quartile of the difference between new versus previous firm performance. The different 
industry subsample considers movers who move across different industries. The same 
industry subsample considers movers who move within the same industries. Industry is 
defined based on 3-digit SIC codes. The subsample of movers that move with a minor change 
of output includes inventors who have moved between firms with a change of patent output 
within 25% in 3 years. Panel A - G correspond to the estimation with seven different 
subsamples described above. The connected group is constructed after restricting to this set of 
movers. If a mover moves more than once, it is excluded from the subsamples. The 
estimation is implemented by using the Stata command “felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen 
(2008). Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patents as the 
dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number 
of citations per patent as the dependent variable (zero if no patents filed by an inventor of a 
year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit and Explore indices as the dependent variables 
(missing value is assigned if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Definitions of 
variables are defined in the table of appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Moving down 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.313 (56.29%) 0.290 (63.74%) 0.341 (55.63%) 0.336 (51.22%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.024 (4.32%) 0.015 (3.30%) 0.227 (37.03%) 0.239 (36.43%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 13.042 19.333 1.502 1.406 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.95*** 1.90*** 2.18*** 2.49*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.77*** 1.72*** 1.26*** 1.34*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.09*** 2.01*** 1.94*** 2.68*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.459 0.336 0.397 0.464 
# Movers 5,218 5,218 2,898 2,898 
# Stayers 159,038 159,038 142,125 142,125 
# Firms 1,768 1,768 1,201 1,201 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 925,847 925,847 409,164 409,164 
 
 
Panel B:  Moving up 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.284 (51.26%) 0.270 (59.60%) 0.321 (52.45%) 0.305 (46.56%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.051 (9.21%) 0.033 (7.28%) 0.246 (40.20%) 0.267 (40.76%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 5.569 8.182 1.305 1.142 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.95*** 1.90*** 2.18*** 2.50*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.77*** 1.72*** 1.26*** 1.34*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.32*** 2.16*** 1.82*** 2.81*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.457 0.334 0.398 0.465 
# Movers 5,599 5,599 2,936 2,936 
# Stayers 159,129 159,129 141,933 141,933 
# Firms 1,761 1,761 1,135 1,135 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 933,435 933,435 411,053 411,053 
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Panel C: Moving to firms with similar operating performance  
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.294 (52.69%) 0.278 (60.43%) 0.451 (73.81%) 0.354 (54.13%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.036 (6.45%) 0.022 (4.78%) 0.118 (19.31%) 0.223 (34.10%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 8.167 12.636 3.822 1.587 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.99*** 1.95*** 2.28*** 2.60*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.80*** 1.76*** 1.29*** 1.36*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.06*** 1.99*** 2.30*** 3.42*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.463 0.345 0.401 0.467 
# Movers 5,427 5,427 3,498 3,498 
# Stayers 150,590 150,590 131,219 131,219 
# Firms 1,307 1,307 892 892 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 895,237 895,237 387,661 387,661 
 
 
Panel D: Moving to firms with different operating performance  
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.295 (53.06%) 0.275 (60.44%) 0.323 (52.69%) 0.303 (46.26%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.042 (7.55%) 0.030 (6.59%) 0.245 (39.97%) 0.271 (41.37%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 7.024 9.167 1.318 1.118 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.95*** 1.89*** 2.18*** 2.49*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.77*** 1.72*** 1.25*** 1.34*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.26*** 2.16*** 1.87*** 2.79*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.459 0.335 0.398 0.464 
# Movers 5,411 5,411 2,942 2,942 
# Stayers 159,734 159,734 141,570 141,570 
# Firms 1,841 1,841 1,202 1,202 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 930,188 930,188 409,775 409,775 
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Panel E: Moving across different industries 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.289 (52.64%) 0.273 (61.35%) 0.339 (55.57%) 0.326 (50.00%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.047 (8.56%) 0.032 (7.19%) 0.227 (37.21%) 0.246 (37.73%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 6.149 8.531 1.493 1.325 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.94*** 1.88*** 2.16*** 2.46*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.76*** 1.70*** 1.24*** 1.33*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.52*** 2.61*** 2.45*** 3.47*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.452 0.326 0.391 0.458 
# Movers 14,443 14,443 7,473 7,473 
# Stayers 165,613 165,613 152,929 152,929 
# Firms 2,997 2,997 1,903 1,903 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,036,775 1,036,775 453,325 453,325 
 
 
Panel F: Moving within the same industry 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.310 (55.96%) 0.285 (62.91%) 0.430 (69.47%) 0.450 (68.70%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.024 (4.33%) 0.019 (4.19%) 0.147 (23.75%) 0.123 (18.78%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 12.917 15.000 2.925 3.659 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.97*** 1.92*** 2.32*** 2.56*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.78*** 1.73*** 1.29*** 1.35*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.24*** 2.23*** 2.99*** 3.97*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.457 0.335 0.408 0.463 
# Movers 11,107 11,107 7,033 7,033 
# Stayers 156,462 156,462 138,270 138,270 
# Firms 2,135 2,135 1,532 1,532 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 958,953 958,953 412,490 412,490 
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Panel G: Moving with a minor change of output  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitation Exploit Explore 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.290 (51.69%) 0.269 (58.35%) 0.368 (59.84%) 0.332 (50.00%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.029 (5.17%)    0.026 (5.64%) 0.197 (32.03%) 0.248 (37.35%) 
Inventor FE / Firm FE 10.000 10.346 1.868 1.339 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 2.01*** 1.97*** 2.16*** 2.54*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.82*** 1.79*** 1.28*** 1.36*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 2.02*** 2.08*** 1.15** 1.95*** 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.470 0.349 0.403 0.478 
# Movers 2,938 2,938 910 910 
# Stayers 115,790 115,790 101,990 101,990 
# Firms 1,314 1,314 581 581 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functional Area FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 700,903 700,903 292,440 292,440 
 
 
